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PROBING THE EFFECTS OF
JUDICIAL SPECIALIZATION
LAWRENCE BAUM†
Americans typically think of judges as generalists. For some
people, this quality is highly desirable or even inherent in the role of
1
judge. But in reality, the judiciary includes a good deal of
specialization, and the extent of that specialization has increased over
time. People within and outside the courts have given considerable
attention to some aspects of that development, but they have not
sufficiently considered the implications of the extent and growth of
judicial specialization.
In their article, Jeffrey Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie, and Andrew
Wistrich address one important implication—the impact of
2
specialization on the behavior of judges. Specifically, they consider
how the specialization of most administrative law judges affects the
ways they make choices. In this Response, I consider more broadly
how specialization can affect judges’ behavior as well as the task of
ascertaining its effects. I argue that specialization can have powerful
effects on judicial decisions through immersion of judges in specific
fields of legal policy and judicial expertise and through the enhanced
influence of political and legal interests in those fields. At present,
understanding of those effects is limited. Because of the potential
importance of those effects, more concerted efforts by scholars to
identify them would have great value.

Copyright © 2009 by Lawrence Baum.
† Professor of Political Science, The Ohio State University. I appreciate ideas and
suggestions on the issues discussed in this Response from James Brudney, Mitu Gulati, David
Klein, and Isaac Unah.
1. See, e.g., MARTIN SHAPIRO, THE SUPREME COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
53 (1968) (“To the extent that [courts] specialize, they lose the one quality that clearly
distinguishes them from administrative lawmakers.”).
2. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, The “Hidden Judiciary”: An
Empirical Examination of Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477, 1479 (2009).
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I. THE RACHLINSKI, GUTHRIE, AND WISTRICH STUDY
Rachlinski, Guthrie, and Wistrich (the authors) have carried out
a series of well-designed experimental studies in which they analyze
3
the cognitive processes of judges as decisionmakers. To oversimplify
a theoretical formulation and set of findings that are both rich and
complex, the authors have found that judges are susceptible to the
same imperfections in reasoning as other people: essentially, they rely
heavily on intuitive thinking (as distinguished from deliberative
thinking). Intuitive thinking has some advantages for decisionmaking,
but it tends to foster faulty judgments. To take one example, judges
are susceptible to “anchoring.” One manifestation of anchoring is that
simply informing judges of a high demand by the plaintiff causes them
4
to award more money than they would without that information.
In most of the authors’ research, the participating judges have
been generalists, in that they deal with a wide array of cases in their
5
work. But one of their past studies concerned bankruptcy judges,
who are certainly specialists. In the parts of the bankruptcy study that
were comparable with the authors’ research on generalist judges, they
found similar reliance on intuitive thinking. In the parts of the study
for which there were no directly comparable findings on generalist
judges, however, the bankruptcy judges did well in disregarding
considerations that would detract from the quality of decisionmaking.
This result left open the possibility that the specialization of
bankruptcy judges improves the processes by which they reach
decisions. On the other hand, bankruptcy judges with more
experience in the job did not differ substantially from less
experienced judges. This finding suggests that time spent in the role

3. E.g., Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench:
How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 29–42 (2007) [hereinafter Guthrie et al.,
Blinking on the Bench] (offering ways that the judicial system can encourage judges to think
deliberatively); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial
Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 780–84 (2001) [hereinafter Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial
Mind] (exploring the impact of cognitive illusions on judicial decisions empirically); Andrew J.
Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information:
The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1258–59 (2005) (discussing
judges’ inability to ignore inadmissible information).
4. Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench, supra note 3, at 19–21.
5. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Bankruptcy
Judge’s Mind, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1230 (2006) (using bankruptcy judges as a case study to
examine the impact of specialization on judicial decisions).
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of a specialized judge does not affect the decisionmaking processes
6
that the study analyzed.
The authors’ article for this Symposium examines another set of
judges—administrative law judges. As they point out, these judges are
quite important because of their large numbers and thus the volume
7
of cases that they decide at the state and federal levels. Moreover, as
8
controversies over the work of federal immigration judges suggest,
their decisions help to shape policy on major issues.
Many, probably most, administrative law judges are specialists in
9
the work of a single administrative agency, so a study of their
decisionmaking provides another vantage point on judging by
specialists. Further, as the authors point out, administrative law
judges who work within a single agency are more accountable for
their decisions than are judges within the judicial branch. As a
consequence, they receive a relatively large volume of feedback on
10
their performance. Thus, comparison of administrative law judges
with generalist judges in the judicial branch provides a means to
probe the impact of both accountability and specialization on
judgment.
The authors’ findings on administrative law judges are similar to
11
the findings of their studies of generalist judges. Although most of
the judges in this study were specialists in a particular subject matter,
for the most part they engaged in the same intuitive decisionmaking
as the nonspecialists who participated in earlier studies. Thus this
study provides evidence that specialization does not have a
substantial effect on how judges think through their choices.
There is an unavoidable limitation to this study and the other
studies that the authors have carried out. Like experimental research
in general, their work maximizes internal validity, but with a potential

6. See id. at 1256–59 (“[T]he bankruptcy judges performed much like the generalist judges
we have previously studied.”).
7. See Guthrie et al., supra note 2, at 1479.
8. See, e.g., Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Phillip G. Schrag, Refugee
Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 302 (2007); Nina Bernstein,
New York’s Immigration Courts Lurch Under a Growing Burden, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2006, at
A1; Pamela A. MacLean, Immigration Bench Plagued by Flaws, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 6, 2006, at 1.
9. See Guthrie et al., supra note 2, at 1478.
10. See id. at 1483–91.
11. See id. at 1480.
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12

cost in external validity. In other words, the experimental setting
allows researchers to control or exclude influences on behavior other
than those in which they are interested, but that setting differs from
the situations in which the behavior that interests researchers actually
occurs. More specifically, the authors asked judges to carry out
decisionmaking tasks in a context different from the one in which
they decide actual cases. For one thing, judges often have more time
to reach decisions than the experimental setting provides. Another
difference is that judges ordinarily make decisions after hearing from
both sides, so that they get multiple and competing perspectives on
the questions they resolve. Moreover, in the study of administrative
law judges, the wide range of specialties for those judges made it
impossible to give them decisionmaking tasks in the experiment that
matched their fields of specialization. (The authors did match tasks to
13
specialization in the bankruptcy study.) Thus, extrapolating from the
study findings to judicial decisionmaking requires caution.
This caution, however, should not obscure the importance of the
authors’ findings in the study of administrative law judges and its
predecessors. Those findings serve as a reminder that, despite their
training and experience, judges are not immune from the
imperfections in reasoning that are widespread in the general
population. Even if judges make their actual decisions under
conditions that reduce those imperfections, it is implausible that the
imperfections disappear altogether when judges are on the bench.
Moreover, some common attributes of decisionmaking in trial
courts—the large number of decisions that are made quickly under
considerable pressure—may actually foster reliance on intuitive
processes.
The authors’ findings also provide a valuable starting point for
inquiry into the settings in which judicial decisionmaking takes place.
One of the central findings of social psychology is that inherent
characteristics of individuals have less impact on their behavior, and
situations in which they find themselves have greater impact on
14
behavior, than people generally think. Some structures and
procedures for decisionmaking reduce imperfections in decision
12. See Leonie Huddy, Crossing the Methodological and Disciplinary Divide: Political
Stability, Political Change, and Research Method, in POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 271, 273–74
(Kristen Renwick Monroe ed., 2002).
13. See Rachlinski et al., supra note 5, at 1260–65.
14. See LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION:
PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 3–4 (1991).
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15

processes more effectively than others. In the institutional design of
courts, one goal should be to identify mechanisms that foster effective
decisionmaking.
One mechanism that might improve judicial decisionmaking is
specialization of judges. Indeed, many commentators have advocated
16
specialization as a means to improve judicial decisionmaking. The
findings of the authors’ studies of bankruptcy judges and
administrative law judges provide significant evidence, perhaps
unsurprising, that the basic reasoning processes of generalist and
specialist judges do not differ fundamentally. But those findings do
not preclude the possibility that specialization produces other types of
differences in decisionmaking. The extent of the specialization that
exists in the American judiciary—an extent greater than is generally
recognized—enhances the importance of any differences in
decisionmaking that result from specialization.
II. THE MEANING OF JUDICIAL SPECIALIZATION
An inquiry into judicial specialization must begin by considering
what that term means. Specialization in any area of human activity
17
has multiple facets. For instance, restricting a court’s jurisdiction to a
particular geographical area represents one form of specialization.
18
Even within the category that can be called functional specialization,
all judges—or at least all those who serve full-time—are specialized
simply by doing the job of a judge. When people refer to
specialization in the judiciary, they usually mean another form of
functional specialization, defined in terms of case type. Generalist
19
judges hear a wide range of cases; specialists hear a narrow range.

15. See Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench, supra note 3, at 29–43.
16. See sources cited infra note 32.
17. See HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISIONMAKING PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONS 28–35 (2d ed. 1961).
18. I use the term functional specialization to refer to specialization on the basis of the type
of work that people do. See id. at 21.
19. Subject matter specialization can be defined in terms of cases as well as judges.
Specialization by judges, the more familiar dimension, concerns the extent to which judges focus
on narrow sets of cases. The other dimension, which may be called concentration of cases,
concerns the extent to which a particular type of case is decided by a narrow set of judges. See
Lawrence Baum, Judicial Specialization, Litigant Influence, and Substantive Policy: The Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals, 11 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 823, 826–27 (1977); Richard L. Revesz,
Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PENN. L. REV. 1111, 1121–
30 (1990). Concentration of cases can be consequential for judicial decisionmaking, but in this
Response, I focus on specialization by judges.
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I refer to “judges” rather than “courts” because the judge is the
appropriate unit to consider. To the extent that specialization by case
type affects what courts do, it is primarily because individual judges
do work that has only a limited range in its subject matter. One
implication of the distinction between courts and judges is that
organization charts of court systems may be misleading about the
extent and form of specialization. The state and federal court systems
20
have a good many courts that are formally specialized. But there is a
good deal of specialization within state trial courts that statewide
21
organization charts do not disclose. In large trial courts, judges are
often assigned to hear specific types of cases rather than the full range
of cases that fall within the court’s jurisdiction. The extent of that
form of specialization has grown with the movement to establish
entities that participants and commentators have called problemsolving courts, such as drug courts, mental health courts, and
22
domestic violence courts. Largely because of this specialization

20. A partial list of existing and former specialized federal courts is at the website of the
Federal Judicial Center. Fed. Judicial Ctr., Courts of the Federal Judiciary, http://www.fjc.
gov/public/home.nsf/hisc (last visited Feb. 24, 2009). Organization charts of the state court
systems are presented in COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE
COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS, 2007, at 16–67 (2008), available at http://www.ncsconline.
org/D_Research/csp/2007_files/Introduction%20to%20State%20Court%20Caseload%20Statist
ics.pdf.
21. For instance, the organization chart of the Illinois courts portrays a single trial court,
the Circuit Court. COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, supra note 20, at 29. But the Circuit Court of
Cook County is divided into divisions and departments that hear specific types of cases. STATE
OF ILLINOIS, CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY: AN INFORMATIONAL GUIDE 3–6 (rev. ed.
2009), available at http://www.cookcountycourt.org/publications/pdf/Informational-Guide.pdf.
Both the Circuit Court of Cook County and its predecessors also have created some specialized
courtrooms for specific types of criminal offenses or defendants, even prior to the development
of problem-solving courts. See ALFRED R. LINDESMITH, THE ADDICT AND THE LAW 90–93
(1965) (drug court); MICHAEL WILLRICH, CITY OF COURTS: SOCIALIZING JUSTICE IN
PROGRESSIVE ERA CHICAGO 119–240 (2003) (domestic relations court, morals court, and boys’
court); Leslie Baldacci, 200 Defendants Come and Go Daily in Gun Court, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Dec. 21, 1992, at 7 (gun court). There is a degree of unofficial specialization in the federal
courts, primarily through case and opinion assignment. On opinion assignment, see Edward K.
Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519, 526 (2008).
22. Problem-solving courts have been defined in different ways. According to one scholar,
“the essential ingredients are enhanced judicial oversight, lengthier case management (including
post-sentencing supervision), and a general philosophy of restorative rather than retributive
justice.” Jeffrey A. Butts, Introduction: Problem-Solving Courts, 23 L. & POL’Y 121, 121 (2001).
A participant in the movement to establish problem-solving courts says of initiatives to establish
problem-solving courts that “they all seek to use the authority of courts to address the
underlying problems of individual litigants, the structural problems of the justice system, and
the social problems of communities.” Greg Berman, “What is a Traditional Judge Anyway?”
Problem Solving in the State Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 78, 78 (2000). On types of problem-solving
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within courts, a substantial proportion of American judges each hear
a relatively narrow subset of the cases that come to the courts.
Judicial specialization takes different forms, and I should make
several distinctions. The first is between long-term and short-term
specialization. Some judges have permanent assignments to particular
types of cases, including, by definition, judges who serve on
specialized courts. Bankruptcy judges hear only bankruptcy cases so
long as they retain their positions. In contrast, within state courts,
judges often are assigned to particular types of cases for specified or
unspecified periods, moving from one subject matter to another over
23
time. The effects of specialization on judges’ decisionmaking
processes are probably greater when judges are permanently assigned
to a particular class of cases. Among other things, judges’ awareness
that they will continue to hear the same types of cases for a long
period can affect their thinking.
The second distinction is between full-time and part-time
specialization. Judges who serve solely on specialized courts hear only
cases within the jurisdiction of those courts, and judges who specialize
within state trial courts usually focus on a single type of case for some
period of time. In contrast, some judges move back and forth between
a broad docket and a narrower one. This has been true of some of the
specialized federal courts, such as the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court, whose judges are drawn from the district courts
24
and courts of appeals as needed. Similarly, some state trial judges
devote only part of their time to the specialized dockets of problemsolving courts such as mental health courts and homeless courts
because those dockets do not include enough business to occupy
courts, see GREG BERMAN & JOHN FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS: THE CASE FOR PROBLEMSOLVING JUSTICE 8–9, 190–95 (2005); Pamela M. Casey & David B. Rottman, Problem-Solving
Courts: Models and Trends, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 35, 36–49 (2005).
23. On assignment practices and rotation of assignments in the Circuit Court of Cook
County (Illinois), see Herbert Jacob, The Governance of Trial Judges, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 3,
10–15 (1997).
24. Past examples include the Emergency Court of Appeals (which heard cases involving
price controls during and after World War II), the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals
(which heard cases involving price controls and other economic regulations in the 1970s and
1980s), the Special Court, Regional Rail Reorganization Act (which heard cases growing out of
the reorganization of freight railroads in the Northeast), and the Special Counsel Panel (which
chose special counsel to investigate criminal matters in the executive branch). These courts are
discussed in Theodore W. Ruger, The Judicial Appointment Power of the Chief Justice, 7 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 341, 359–67 (2004). On the establishment of the special court under the Regional
Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, see Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 102–03
(1974).
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judges full time. Even if a judge focuses on a particular subject matter
25
for only one court session a month, that focus can shape how a judge
approaches cases. But a full-time specialization has greater potential
to influence that approach.
The third distinction concerns the breadth of the cases that a
specialized court or a subunit of that court hears. Specialization by
judges is not a dichotomy. Rather, it falls along a continuum. There is
room for disagreement about the relative breadth of different sets of
cases, but clearly some specialized judges hear a wider array of cases
than others. The public law jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania
26
27
Commonwealth Court and the “hodge-podge” jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit are considerably broader
than the jurisdiction of the United States Tax Court. A judge who
hears a full range of criminal cases and no civil cases is a specialist,
but not to the same degree as a judge who hears only cases in which
defendants are charged with domestic violence. The extent of any
effects of specialization should vary with the breadth of a judge’s
specialized field.
A final distinction concerns specialization within criminal law.
Subject matter specialization in that field can be similar to
specialization in other fields in that it is based on case type. But in
28
criminal law, some courts specialize by defendant type. The most
widespread examples of specialization by defendant type are juvenile
29
courts. Other defendant-defined courts include homeless courts,
30
mental health courts, and drug courts that deal with an array of
offenses allegedly committed by people who are addicted to drugs
25. At least for several years, the San Diego Homeless Court met once a month. Charlie
LeDuff, Lifting Hurdles as the Homeless Rebound, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2004, at A14.
26. See David W. Craig, The Court for Appeals—and Trials—of Public Issues: The First 25
Years of Pennsylvania’s Commonwealth Court, 4 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 321, 323 (1995).
27. Diane P. Wood, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Generalist
Judges in a Specialized World, Speech at the Eighth Annual Judge Irving L. Goldberg Lecture
Series (Feb. 11, 1997), in 50 SMU L. REV. 1755, 1765 (1997).
28. The Court of Federal Claims may also be considered a specialist by (civil) defendant
type because it hears only cases brought against the federal government.
29. The prototype for homeless courts is the San Diego Homeless Court, established in
1989 primarily to serve the needs of homeless military veterans. See Tony Perry, Homeless
Court Offers New Hope for the Down and Out, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 2000, at A3.
30. The first mental health court was established in Broward County (Fort Lauderdale),
Florida, in 1997. See GINGER LERNER-WREN, NAT’L CTR. STATE COURTS, BROWARD’S
MENTAL HEALTH COURT: AN INNOVATIVE APPROACH TO THE MENTALLY DISABLED IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 2 (2000), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/
KIS_ProSol_Trends99-00_FlaMentalPub.pdf.
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(rather than with drug offenses). It is not clear how specialization by
subject matter and by defendant type might differ in their effects, but
there is a potential for substantial differences.
In a relatively brief analysis of the potential effects of judicial
specialization, it is impossible to take these distinctions fully into
account. But it is important to keep these distinctions in mind,
because any generalizations about the effects of specialization apply
more accurately to some forms of specialization than to others.
III. THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF SPECIALIZATION
Advocates of judicial specialization regularly cite what they see
32
as the benefits of specialization for courts’ work, benefits that they
usually label as efficiency, expertise, and uniformity. Uniformity
refers to minimizing conflicts in interpretations of the law. To the
extent that specialization brings uniformity, that effect results from
reducing the number of judges who decide cases in a field of law
rather than from reducing the range of cases that particular judges
33
hear. In contrast, commentators who associate efficiency and
expertise with specialization expect it to result from judges’ focus on
relatively narrow sets of cases, the dimension of specialization on
which this Response focuses. Of course, perceptions of those benefits
are largely responsible for the general movement toward
34
specialization in government and society.

31. The first drug court of this type was established in Miami in 1989. See Michael Isikoff &
William Booth, Miami “Drug Court” Demonstrates Reno’s Unorthodox Approach, WASH.
POST, Feb. 20, 1993, at A1; Ronald Smothers, Miami Tries Treatment, Not Jail, in Drug Cases,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1993, at A6.
32. See, e.g., STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, SPECIALIZED JUSTICE: COURTS, ADMINISTRATIVE
TRIBUNALS, AND A CROSS-NATIONAL THEORY OF SPECIALIZATION 7–19 (1990); Harold H.
Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 330–31 (1991); David
P. Currie & Frank I. Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Quest for the
Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 63–68 (1975); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Specialized
Adjudication, 1990 BYU L. REV. 377, 377–78; Ellen R. Jordan, Specialized Courts: A Choice?,
76 NW. U. L. REV. 745, 747–48 (1981); Daniel J. Meador, An Appellate Court Dilemma and a
Solution Through Subject Matter Organization, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 471, 481–82 (1983);
Sarang Vijay Damle, Note, Specialize the Judge, Not the Court: A Lesson from the German
Constitutional Court, 91 VA. L. REV. 1267, 1275–79 (2005).
33. For a discussion regarding the distinction between these two dimensions of
specialization, see supra note 19.
34. For descriptions of these perceived benefits, see, for example, SIMON, supra note 17, at
10, 20; ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 1–60 (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1976) (1776).
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Efficiency is fairly straightforward. Repeating similar tasks may
enhance efficiency by allowing people to develop routines and giving
them greater familiarity with their tasks. Thus it seems reasonable to
assume that judges who hear only cases involving international trade
law process those cases more quickly than judges who hear only
occasional international trade cases. Specialization in the judiciary
might create certain inefficiencies, because parties would need to
litigate jurisdictional boundaries and specialized courts might have
too few cases to fully utilize their judges’ time. But these inefficiencies
have nothing to do with the effects of specialization on judges’
thinking, so they can be left aside.
Expertise is not so straightforward. Efficiency is a result; in
contrast, expertise is an attribute that might produce certain results.
For one thing, any gains in efficiency that result from specialization
are partly the product of judges’ gaining expertise through
concentration on a particular subject matter. What commentators
generally mean when they talk about expertise seems to be the
possibility that expertise will enhance the quality of court decisions:
more expert judges, who know more about the field in which they are
deciding cases, are more likely to get decisions right. Commentators
make that argument most fervently about fields of law in which they
think that judges who lack special expertise have difficulty
35
understanding the issues, especially taxes and patents.
Getting decisions right might mean multiple things. In most
discussions of expertise and specialization, it implicitly refers to
applying the law to the facts properly. Alternatively, it might mean
making the decision that best reflects a judge’s conception of good
public policy. Different as those two meanings are, they share the
premise that expertise improves judges’ capacities to reach decisions
that are consistent with what they are trying to accomplish.
Judges might be chosen to serve on specialized courts on the
basis of preexisting expertise. This is the regular practice for the
federal Tax Court, staffed by people who specialized in tax law as
36
practitioners. Some judges on other specialized courts come to those

35. See, e.g., HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 155–59
(1973).
36. For the biographies of sitting and senior Tax Court judges, see U.S. Tax Court, Judges,
http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/judges.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2009).
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courts with relevant backgrounds. If judges lack expertise when they
join a court, the expectation is that they will gain it through
immersion in the court’s work.
It is likely that specialization has some of the positive effects on
the quality of decisionmaking that its advocates cite. On the other
38
hand, specialization might have negative effects on quality as well.
Both the potential positive and negative effects of judicial
specialization should be put in a broader framework—a framework
that encompasses the variety of ways that specialization in a
particular subject matter can affect how judges make decisions and,
ultimately, the substance of their decisions. These effects fall into two
categories: first, effects relating to judges’ immersion in a particular
field and judicial expertise, and second, effects relating to the
influence of interest groups in the specialized field.
The possible positive impact of specialization on efficiency and
on the quality of decisionmaking falls in the first category. Three
other possible effects of immersion and expertise, actual and selfperceived, are assertiveness, insularity, and stereotyping.
Assertiveness grows out of the self-perception of expertise.
Specialized judges who come to a court with experience in the subject
matter of their court’s work or who develop that experience as judges
can be expected to feel greater confidence in their judgment than
their generalist counterparts. Because of this confidence, they are
likely to be more assertive than generalists in their policymaking. One
possibility is that they will be more willing to overturn administrative
39
decisions. Another is that they will be more inclined to make
sweeping decisions that change policy substantially.
In his classic book on bureaucracy, Anthony Downs cites
40
insularity as another effect of immersion in a narrow field. People
come to see the decisions they make from the perspective of the field
in which they work and give little weight to other perspectives. This

37. See Ralph R. Mabey, The Evolving Bankruptcy Bench: How Are the “Units” Faring?,
47 B.C. L. REV. 105, 107, 123 (2005) (bankruptcy judges).
38. E.g., Currie & Goodman, supra note 32, at 68–74; Jordan, supra note 32, at 748;
Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984? An Essay on
Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 783–88 (1983);
Revesz, supra note 19, at 155–65; Damle, supra note 32, at 1281–86.
39. E.g., ISAAC UNAH, THE COURTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE: JUDICIAL
SPECIALIZATION, EXPERTISE, AND BUREAUCRATIC POLICY MAKING 131–70 (1998); Bruff,
supra note 32, at 332; Currie & Goodman, supra note 32, at 71.
40. ANTHONY DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 103–07 (1967).
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tendency can develop in the judiciary as well. One possible
manifestation of insularity concerns the authority of higher officials.
Within organizations, highly specialized subordinates tend to accord
less authority to their superiors than do generalists because they see
42
generalist superiors as less knowledgeable than themselves.
Specialized judges might respond in this way to higher courts staffed
by generalists. Indeed, this effect appears to have occurred in the
relationship between the Supreme Court and the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals (which was folded into the Court of Appeals for
43
the Federal Circuit in 1982).
Stereotypes are another possible effect of judges’ immersion in a
particular type of case. If judges hear a succession of similar cases,
they may ascribe the attributes of past cases to current cases. The
work of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court is a possible
example. Although the surveillance court constitutes part-time duty
for the federal judges who sit on it, each of those judges typically
hears several dozen requests a year for warrants to conduct electronic
surveillance. The surveillance court almost never denies these
requests, largely because of the lenient statutory requirements for
44
approval, so judges may develop a strong expectation that any given
warrant request is justified. If all district judges randomly heard
warrant requests, that expectation might not be nearly as strong—
though even if this were the case, the outcomes might not be much
45
different because of the statutory rules.
In a second category of potential effects, specialization by judges
can change the relative success of the political and legal interests that
are concerned with the subject matter of court decisions by enhancing
the influence of certain interests. Enhanced influence may arise in the
selection of judges and in the operation of courts.

41. E.g., Jordan, supra note 32, at 748; Damle, supra note 32, at 1281–83.
42. JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY
THEY DO IT 91–101 (1989).
43. See Lawrence Baum, Specialization and Authority Acceptance: The Supreme Court and
Lower Federal Courts, 47 POL. RES. Q. 693, 693 (1994).
44. See James E. Meason, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Time for Reappraisal,
24 INT’L LAW. 1043, 1057 (1990).
45. On the other hand, during the George W. Bush administration the judges on the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court demonstrated some independence, and arguably their
familiarity with the field helped to foster that independence—or, in the term I have used in this
Part, their assertiveness. See ERIC LICHTBLAU, BUSH’S LAW: THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN
JUSTICE 164–66 (2008).
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In the selection of judges, interest groups that care about case
outcomes in a policy area gain a better opportunity to influence the
46
selection process when a court concentrates its efforts on that field.
If a court hears only tax cases, then groups that care about tax policy
need not compete with their counterparts in other fields when they
try to exert influence over the selection of judges for a particular
court. Further, their specialization in a court’s field of work enhances
47
their legitimacy as participants in the selection process : who knows
more than tax lawyers about the qualifications of prospective judges
to decide tax cases?
Other mechanisms operate within courts themselves. Interest
groups gain a better opportunity to influence judges who hear only a
48
narrow set of cases. The lawyers who come before any court shape
the attitudes of judges toward the issues they confront in a field of
legal policy. For judges who hear cases only in one field, the
specialized bar in that field interacts more frequently with the judges
than it would with judges who are generalists. In turn, this interaction
allows more chances to help shape judges’ thinking. And to the extent
that judges benefit from the cooperation of lawyers and litigants or
care about their approval, specialized judges are dependent on a
narrow set of court participants.
This enhanced opportunity for influence may have little effect if
the competing interests balance out. But in some areas of law, one
side holds a permanent advantage, often because it is more
concentrated and thus better organized than its competitor. When
government constitutes one side, as it does in courts that review
administrative decisions, it often holds the special advantage of
selecting judges itself. The president and Senate choose judges for
such courts as the Tax Court and the Court of International Trade.
Professor Lynn LoPucki has described another basis for advantage in
a specific context. As he sees it, because debtor corporations can

46. NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 145 (1994) (“Courts become more attractive targets for
special interest groups as their jurisdiction is narrowed.”); Revesz, supra note 19, at 1147–53.
But see Jeffrey W. Stempel, Two Cheers for Specialization, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 67, 97–105 (1995)
(“Prevailing theory on specialized courts posits that they frequently are targeted by interest
group activity and are more likely than are generalist courts to be ‘captured’ by powerful
interest groups and become indirectly politicized.” (footnote omitted)).
47. Bruff, supra note 32, at 331–32; Currie & Goodman, supra note 32, at 70–71; Dreyfuss,
supra note 32, at 379–80.
48. Bruff, supra note 32, at 332; Dreyfuss, supra note 32, at 380.
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choose among federal districts when they file for bankruptcy, they
can steer cases to districts in which bankruptcy judges are favorable
to debtor corporations and their attorneys. And because bankruptcy
judges find large corporate bankruptcy cases attractive, they have a
49
strong incentive to adopt those favorable policies. Whether or not
one side has an advantage in its influence over a court, the two sides
that appear in litigation may share a point of view and thus jointly
shape judges’ perceptions. Arguably, this is the case with the
preference of the patent bar for a relatively lenient standard of
50
patentability.
This list of potential effects may suggest that the negative effects
of judicial specialization outweigh the positive consequences. That
conclusion would be premature for several reasons. First, if
specialization does increases efficiency and if the expertise that it
fosters enhances the quality of decisionmaking, those benefits may
outweigh any undesirable effects of specialization.
Second, some potential effects of specialization that seem
negative on their face are not necessarily so. Judicial assertiveness
sounds negative, but at least under some circumstances it might
improve public policy. If specialization strengthens the influence of
certain interests over a court’s work, sometimes that enhanced
influence too might bring about improvement in the quality of policy.
The most important reason to be cautious in reaching
conclusions about the desirability of judicial specialization is the
limited information that exists on its impact. The existing scholarship
provides only a fragmentary understanding of the extent to which the
potential effects of judicial specialization—positive, negative, or
51
mixed—actually occur. The dearth of information about the impact
of specialization merits consideration.

49. LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 19–24 (2005). For a different view, see Melissa B.
Jacoby, Fast, Cheap, and Creditor-Controlled: Is Corporate Reorganization Failing?, 54 BUFF. L.
REV. 401, 403 (2006).
50. Baum, supra note 19, at 835.
51. In this respect, judicial specialization is hardly unique among issues concerning the
quality of judging and of court performance. In large part, the fragmentary understanding of
such issues that scholarship provides reflects formidable methodological challenges, of which
measuring quality is perhaps the most serious. On the task of measurement, see David F. Levi &
Mitu Gulati, Judging Measures, 77 UMKC L. REV. 1, 2 (2008) (“In order to achieve a more
reliable and useful measurement, judges must be involved in the process of arriving at the right
characteristics to measure and the right ways to measure them.”).
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IV. ASCERTAINING THE EFFECTS OF SPECIALIZATION
The possibilities that I described in the preceding Part suggest
that specialization of judges might have significant effects on their
work. Debates over specific proposals for specialized courts and the
general movement toward greater specialization in the courts reflect a
belief that such effects exist. The empirical evidence on the impact of
specialization, however, is limited. A considerable volume of
scholarship discusses the performance of a few specialized courts,
52
such as the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and types of
53
courts, especially juvenile courts in the states. But there are many
other courts on whose work scholars have done little research, with
the exception (in some instances) of analyses that focus on specific
decisions or clusters of decisions.
Even for courts on which there is substantial scholarship, that
scholarship typically provides little systematic evidence about how
specialization affects the work of courts. Detailed studies of the
behavior of specialized courts offer hints, sometimes very good hints,
about the impact of specialization. One example is Professor
Jonathan Lurie’s study of the Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces, a study that examined the court’s work in detail over its first
three decades and thereby provided a good sense of its role in the
54
military justice system. But direct comparisons between generalist
and specialized courts provide the best evidence about the effects of
giving jurisdiction to specialized judges, and only a limited number of
such studies exist.
To a degree, the dearth of comparative studies reflects the
difficulty of comparing generalist and specialist judges. Sometimes, a
good point of reference for comparison does not exist. To return to
the example of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, nobody
can really know how specialization has affected the court’s review of
warrants for surveillance because nonspecialized district judges never
52. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, How Federal Circuit Judges Vote in
Patent Validity Cases, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 745, 765–66 (2000); Timothy J. O’Hearn, Patent
Law Reform via the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982: The Transformation of
Patentability Jurisprudence, 17 AKRON L. REV. 453, 471–72 (1984).
53. See, e.g., BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
JUVENILE COURT 109–65 (1999); ELLEN RYERSON, THE BEST-LAID PLANS: AMERICA’S
JUVENILE COURT EXPERIMENT 78–98 (1978); Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An
Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1187–88 (1970).
54. See JONATHAN LURIE, PURSUING MILITARY JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES, 1951–1980, at 71–106 (1998).
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carried out this review. A similar difficulty arises for some other
specialized courts such as the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
and the Court of Veterans Appeals.
Even when generalist and specialized courts decide the same
types of cases, efforts to compare them can run into measurement
problems. The federal district courts and the Tax Court both hear
challenges to tax assessments by the Internal Revenue Service at the
trial level. For this reason, comparison of the two is attractive. But
differences between the two in jurisdiction and procedure complicate
55
the task of comparison. Because of these differences, intercourt
comparisons of the proportions of decisions favoring the Internal
Revenue Service and taxpayers are likely to be misleading. Scholars
have done useful research comparing the Tax Court and district
56
courts, but they have not yet provided a clear picture of the impact
of specialization on these courts’ policies.
Still, meaningful comparisons are possible. In those instances in
which jurisdiction is transferred from generalist to specialized courts,
scholars can use records of both case outcomes and doctrinal
positions to estimate the effects of the jurisdictional change, so long
as they take into account possible changes in the composition of the
cases that go to court. The transfer of patent infringement litigation
from the federal courts of appeals to the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit is one instance in which there is enough evidence to
57
make clear how the jurisdictional change affected judicial policy.

55. See David Laro, The Evolution of the Tax Court as an Independent Tribunal, 1995 U.
ILL. L. REV. 17, 24–29. The most important difference is that the Tax Court hears cases brought
by people before they have paid their taxes, while the district courts hear lawsuits to recover
money that people have already paid. This difference in itself ensures that the samples of cases
heard by the Tax Court and the district courts are not entirely comparable.
56. See, e.g., Robert M. Howard, Comparing the Decision Making of Specialized Courts
and General Courts: An Exploration of Tax Decisions, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 135, 136–41 (2005);
Daniel M. Schneider, Assessing and Predicting Who Wins Federal Tax Trial Decisions, 37 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 473, 474–75 (2002); Scott Hendrickson, Examining Judicial Independence:
Article I v. Article III Courts 94–145 (Aug. 2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Washington
University) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). For another comparative study of review of
administrative decisions by generalist and specialized federal courts, see UNAH, supra note 39,
at 131–70.
57. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 337–38 (2003) (discussing the shift to the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit and the resulting policy changes); Matthew D. Henry & John L. Turner, The
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s Impact on Patent Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 85, 85–
91 (2006) (same); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court:
A Quiet Revolution, 11 SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 1, 1–7 (2003) (same); Gerald Sobel, The Court
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Further, with appropriate controls for relevant differences, scholars
can systematically compare generalist and specialized courts that hear
the same kinds of cases. If comparisons of case outcomes between the
district courts and the Tax Court are misleading, analysis of the legal
doctrines they have adopted would produce more meaningful
information with which to compare their policy positions.
The states provide abundant opportunities for analysis of both
changes that occur when jurisdiction over a field is transferred from
generalist to specialized courts and differences between generalist
and specialized courts that hear similar cases. Studies can compare
the processes and outputs of specialized courts with those of the
generalist judges who formerly handled the same type of case in the
same jurisdiction. Further, because each type of problem-solving
court exists in only a limited number of jurisdictions, their work can
be compared with the work of generalist courts in similar
jurisdictions. One set of scholars took advantage of that opportunity
in their study of the Midtown Community Court in New York City,
comparing its actions with those of a generalist court in the same
58
borough. Similar studies could be done of an array of other
specialized courts that exist in some states and localities but not in
others.
Because this is an important issue, scholars could make a
valuable contribution by adding to the body of empirical research on
the impact of judicial specialization. Because of the difficulties
involved in analyzing this impact and the limited scholarly attention
that is given to this task, however, any growth in this body of research
is likely to be slow.
In the meantime, the limited knowledge about the impact of
specialization suggests the need for both scholars and participants in
the policymaking process to be careful when making judgments about
that impact. In debates over proposals for specialized courts,
arguments about good or bad consequences of specialization are
common even in the absence of much evidence about those

of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: A Fifth Anniversary Look at Its Impact on Patent Law and
Litigation, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 1087, 1092–105 (1988) (same).
58. MICHELE SVIRIDOFF ET AL., DISPENSING JUSTICE LOCALLY: THE IMPLEMENTATION
AND EFFECTS OF THE MIDTOWN COMMUNITY COURT 109–38 (2000). The court was established
to hear cases involving criminal offenses such as prostitution and disorderly conduct that
advocates of the court perceived as damaging to the community and inadequately handled by
the courts. Id. at 1–2.
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59

consequences. In particular, people who discuss the merits of
proposals for specialized courts tend to conclude from anecdotal
evidence or no direct evidence at all that certain forms of
specialization improve courts’ work. That tendency is reflected in the
speed with which some types of specialization, such as juvenile courts
60
and drug courts, have diffused from place to place. Both
policymakers and scholarly commentators should be slow to reach
conclusions about the desirability of judicial specialization in its
various forms until scholars add substantially to the current body of
knowledge about the effects of specialization on the behavior of
judges.

59. See, e.g., FRIENDLY, supra note 35, at 154.
60. In the opinion of one judge, “Perhaps the most startling thing about the drug court
phenomenon is that drug courts have so quickly become fixtures of our jurisprudence in the
absence of satisfying empirical evidence that they actually work.” Morris B. Hoffman, The Drug
Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1437, 1479–80 (2000).

